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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN ANGOLA (MONUA)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 1213 (1998) of 3 December 1998, in which the Council, inter alia, requested me to submit a report no later than 15 January 1999 regarding the status of the peace process, the future role and mandate of the United Nations in Angola and the force structure of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) in the light of its ability to carry out its mandated tasks.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. Since my previous report, the overall situation in Angola has taken a turn towards a military confrontation with serious humanitarian consequences. Several statements made by the parties, together with the intensifying hostilities, effectively ended any hope for the resumption of the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex) in the foreseeable future. Although Jonas Savimbi of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) reaffirmed in general terms his commitment to the Protocol in his letter addressed to me on 3 December 1998, his subsequent messages to me and to my Special Representative, Issa B. Y. Diallo, gave no indication that UNITA intended to resume the implementation of its key obligations under the Protocol. However, Mr. Savimbi indicated his strong wish to meet with Mr. Diallo as well as the need for the presence of international observers in Angola to serve as "useful witnesses". According to a press report of 13 January 1999, a senior member of UNITA indicated that it wished to re-establish a dialogue with the Government.

3. For his part, the President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos, in his opening address to the Fourth Congress of the Movimento Popular da Libertação de Angola (MPLA), held in Luanda from 5 to 10 December 1998, stated that the only path to lasting peace was the total isolation of Mr. Savimbi and his group. The President called for the early conclusion of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and the termination of the MONUA mandate. At the same time, he indicated the need to begin preparations for the next legislative and

presidential elections, to be held within two to three years. Furthermore, in his end-of-year address, the President reiterated his Government's rejection of any dialogue with Mr. Savimbi. During his meeting with Under-Secretary-General Benon Sevan, whom I dispatched as my Special Emissary in connection with the tragic incidents involving two United Nations aircraft (addressed in paras. 8-10 below), the President stated that the United Nations had completed the implementation of its major tasks.

4. Public statements by both parties appear to indicate their intention to continue and, if necessary, escalate the fighting. In a recent public statement, the Chief of General Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) asserted that "the war had only begun" and that FAA would fight until Mr. Savimbi and his associates were "neutralized". In a similar vein, the Secretary-General of UNITA stated that the rebel movement would step up fighting against the Government of Angola. In this context, he remarked that UNITA was prepared to enter into the military race, declaring that "we would see who would win".

5. My Special Representative, in collaboration with the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America), continued to maintain contacts with the parties, including the newly established UNITA Restoration Committee (UNITA-Renovada) and UNITA deputies to the National Assembly, as well as representatives of civil society in Angola. The withdrawal, on 6 December 1998, of MONUA from UNITA-held areas has significantly hampered communications with that group. Owing to the well-known position of the Government of Angola, my Special Representative has not been able to meet directly with Mr. Savimbi or any of his senior representatives.

6. Government and military officials, as well as representatives from MPLA and UNITA-Renovada, have made public statements claiming that the United Nations was responsible for the present deterioration of the security situation in Angola and for the failure to demilitarize UNITA forces. In view of the obvious implications of such statements for the safety of MONUA and other international personnel in Angola, my Special Representative, supported by representatives of the observer States, protested those assertions. Subsequently, in a note verbale dated 21 December 1998, the Minister of Territorial Administration and head of the government delegation to the Joint Commission advised my Special Representative to concentrate all MONUA personnel in Luanda given the renewal of military hostilities and the fact that MONUA observers were no longer monitoring the situation on the ground, and to gradually repatriate them, since the Government of Angola did not envisage the extension of the mandate of the Mission beyond February 1999.

III. SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL

7. The negative public atmosphere created by the Angola media campaign against the United Nations has been compounded by incidents of harassment and non-cooperation with MONUA in several areas of the country, including Luanda. In view of the increased security threat, MONUA, in close coordination with the Secretariat, continued to review the deployment of its teams and decided, in December 1998, to relocate all United Nations team sites to safer areas.

8. The exposure of United Nations personnel in Angola to grave security risks was demonstrated by the apparent shooting down near Huambo of two United Nations aircraft, with a total of 15 passengers and 8 crew members, on 26 December 1998 and 2 January 1999 respectively. Both aircraft, chartered by MONUA, went down in areas of active military operations. The two Angolan parties denied any responsibility for those incidents. Despite strong and repeated appeals by me, my Special Representative and the Security Council, UNITA and the Government initially showed no inclination to cooperate with MONUA in the search and rescue operations or to cease hostilities in the areas where the aircraft had gone down. Attempts to survey the sites by using United Nations aircraft were not successful, since neither party gave consent to such an operation. In the meantime, the Government presented to the press a purported deserter who claimed that he was aware of several survivors of the first crash. This statement was repeated by some government officials.

9. On 31 December, I dispatched the United Nations Security Coordinator, Under-Secretary-General Sevan, to Angola as my Special Emissary, in order to expedite the conduct of the search-and-rescue operations and to assess the security situation on the ground. On 5 January, Mr. Sevan met with senior government officials and, on 6 January, was received by President dos Santos. Mr. Sevan impressed upon President dos Santos the need to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers in Angola, and asked that senior government officials refrain from making statements that could adversely affect the safety and security of United Nations personnel. During that meeting, President dos Santos promised his Government's assistance in the rescue operations. At that time, FAA had advanced into the area of the first crash, making it possible to visit the site. Also, after numerous attempts, the United Nations received general security assurances from UNITA.

10. On 8 January, the United Nations rescue team, with an escort from FAA, reached the site of the first aircraft. It was able to stay there just short of two hours and had to return to Huambo before dark. According to observers, the aircraft had spiralled to the ground at a very high speed, with the result that much of it was buried. It appeared highly unlikely that there could be any survivors. The team was able to recover some human remains, as well as parts of the cockpit voice recorder, which had been tampered with. The tape has been sent out for analysis. Apparently, an effort had also been made to conceal the aircraft with tree branches. MONUA continued its efforts to visit the site again to pursue the examination of the craft and to recover human remains and equipment. However, at the time of the drafting of the present report, the parties had not allowed MONUA to visit the site because of renewed heavy fighting in the area. Simultaneously, persistent attempts were made to ascertain the site of the second crash. On 12 January, UNITA informed Mr. Sevan that the wreckage had been located.

11. In response to these developments, the United Nations decided to limit its air operations in Angola to the most essential medical and casualty evacuations and to expedite the withdrawal of all its personnel to Luanda, as also requested by the Government. The deployment and rotation of United Nations personnel to the mission area has been stopped. On 7 January, MONUA was informed that, pursuant to the guidance of President dos Santos, all FAA regional commanders had been instructed to cooperate with the United Nations in the withdrawal of

its personnel and equipment from the team sites and regional headquarters. By 14 January, out of a total of 26 team sites and regional headquarters, MONUA had evacuated to Luanda 17 teams, with the remaining scheduled to be fully withdrawn by the beginning of February. While all efforts are being made to ensure that United Nations property is safely recovered from the team sites, it is feared that it may not be possible to withdraw all the equipment from sites located in areas of active combat. At the same time, plans have been finalized for the repatriation of military observers and civilian police. Plans are also being prepared for the repatriation of military contingents.

IV. IMPROVING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MEASURES IMPOSED ON THE UNIÃO NACIONAL PARA A INDEPENDÊNCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA

12. In its resolutions 1202 (1998) of 15 October 1998 and 1213 (1998) of 3 December 1998, the Security Council requested me to provide recommendations regarding technical and other ways for Member States to improve the implementation of the measures against UNITA contained in resolutions 864 (1993), 1127 (1997), 1173 (1998) and 1221 (1999).

13. In order to enhance the implementation of those measures, it would be essential that Governments that are in possession of information concerning violations provide such information to the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 864 (1993) on a regular basis. Governments whose territories are being used by violators of the adopted measures should be ready and willing to take the necessary measures to prevent such violations. In the absence of a monitoring mechanism to support the work of the Committee, the potential role of regional and subregional arrangements to facilitate the implementation of the measures could also be explored.

14. In order to strengthen the implementation of the measures, the Security Council and Member States may wish to consider the following:

(a) Member States, in particular States neighbouring Angola, could provide, on a regular basis, information on the implementation of the measures adopted by the Security Council. The Council could also invite their views on possible ways to strengthen the effectiveness of those measures;

(b) While the responsibility for the implementation of these measures rests with Member States, the Security Council and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) could review the implementation process periodically with a view to identifying and possibly eliminating gaps and monitoring the effectiveness of the adopted measures; such a review may be initiated on the basis of a report by the Chairman of the Committee following a mission that he may wish to undertake to Angola and the countries of the region;

(c) It would be essential that the Committee be provided by Member States, on a regular basis, with the information necessary to enable it to consider and investigate possible violations of the mandatory measures. Cases of confirmed violations could be made public by the Committee or reported to the Security Council;

(d) The Government of Angola and neighbouring States could monitor at least all major border crossings and airports in order to prevent illegal movement across the border. It is noted, however, that it may be extremely difficult to monitor effectively the land borders of Angola, given their length, the difficult terrain and the lack of the necessary infrastructure. In addition, the Government of Angola and the States of the region could consider additional steps to monitor the ports and airstrips in their territories in order to prevent ships and aircraft engaged in violations of the measures from using them;

(e) In cases where public announcements are made that confirm material support for UNITA, the Committee could authorize its Chairman to address letters to the Member States concerned. Similarly, in the event of confirmed violations of the travel ban, the Member States involved could be reminded of their obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions;

(f) The Security Council could authorize the Secretariat to commission an expert study focusing on possible ways of tracing violations of the measures regarding arms trafficking, oil supply and the diamond trade, as well as the movement of UNITA funds.

15. On 12 January 1999, the Security Council adopted resolution 1221 (1999) concerning the issue of the possible suspension of telecommunications to UNITA, as mentioned in paragraph 8 of that resolution. I intend to report to the Council as soon as I receive the expert views that I have sought from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

V. MILITARY ASPECTS

16. The military situation in Angola has deteriorated since early December 1998, with the commencement of a large-scale military operation in the central highlands. The situation remains volatile and very fluid, while information on the fighting is sketchy. The operations commenced on 2 or 3 December with air raids against areas around Bailundo and Mungo, followed by attacks on Andulo on 4 December. Subsequently, UNITA forces launched their own attacks and inflicted heavy casualties, including among the civilian population. In the Kuito sector, UNITA initially occupied several areas, forcing FAA to stop its operation against Andulo. The front apparently had stabilized by the last week of December, as FAA had regained some strategic ground around the town, using heavy artillery and aircraft. In the Huambo sector, UNITA attacks resulted in the withdrawal of FAA from Tchitumbo, Bela Vista and Vila Nova, as well as Alto Hama. The city of Huambo itself was shelled, and a very tense situation among the population was created. Large-scale government reinforcements arrived in the region throughout December, and intense fighting was reported in the vicinity of Huambo during the first week of January 1999. The government side has reportedly recaptured Vila Nova as well as areas in the central highlands, and has reopened the road between Huambo and Kuito.

17. The situation in other provinces remained extremely tense. Increased fighting was reported in the north, in the vicinity of M'Banza Congo and Soyo. Some government troops have redeployed from Uige, Malange, Saurimo, Luena, Cuito

Cuanavale and other areas to reinforce FAA in the central region. UNITA forces have continued to interdict the national highway linking Malange and the Lunda Norte and Lunda Sol provinces, and have launched raids on government positions around the diamond-producing areas of Luzamba. The city of Malange has sustained repeated shelling by UNITA, with numerous casualties among the civilian population. In Moxico province, the high level of insecurity on the roads almost isolated the town of Luena. In Huila province, UNITA reoccupied its old base in Chicuma in a bid to intensify military activities in Huila and Benguela provinces. In the meantime, the military situation became increasingly volatile in the southern region, especially in the northern part of Huila province.

VI. POLICE ASPECTS

18. To the extent possible, civilian police observers attempted to monitor the activities of the Angolan National Police (ANP) to ensure their neutrality and respect for human rights. It should be noted that the civilian police have not been able to report on the situation in the UNITA-controlled areas. Also, on many occasions the escalation of fighting has prevented the observers from carrying out proper investigations and verification of reported incidents. This situation has been aggravated by the markedly non-cooperative attitude of the parties. Increasingly, the attitude of local officials and security agents has prevented civilian police observers and human rights monitors from carrying out patrols and visits to prisons or detention centres.

19. The widening hostilities have had a very negative impact on the general law and order situation in the country. In some areas, ANP has abandoned its traditional police role; its members have often been fighting side by side with FAA. There has been no progress in the efforts of MONUA to obtain cooperation in conducting a training programme for ANP on internationally accepted police procedures and standards. Similarly, no progress has been achieved towards the collection of weapons from the civilian population. Instead, reports indicate that civilians are being armed and organized in civil defence groups in Huambo, Huila, Bié and Benguela provinces, as well as in other areas of potential confrontation with UNITA forces. The role of these defence groups is not limited to the general protection of the population; they also fight alongside FAA after a brief training period.

20. In an effort to ensure the free movement of people and goods, civilian police observers conducted patrols and visited checkpoints manned by FAA/ANP and private companies in the locations not directly affected by the war. Although there has been no increase in the number of unauthorized checkpoints, there were reports of searches, harassment and extortion. Civilian police observers also continued to monitor security arrangements for UNITA leaders. In Luanda, ANP has continued to provide, albeit inconsistently, security protection to senior UNITA representatives. In that regard, it should be noted that five UNITA representatives have been arrested and accused of involvement in UNITA attacks on Kuito, Huambo and Malange.

VII. HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

21. MONUA continued to report grave human rights violations against the civilian population as a result of the escalation of hostilities, particularly in the provinces of Huambo and Bié. Indiscriminate shelling, reportedly by UNITA, killed at least 25 civilians and wounded approximately four times that number in a train station in Kunje, Bié province, on 16 December. According to unofficial sources, there were untold numbers of dead and wounded civilians in the town of Kuito, which humanitarian agencies had not been able to reach for weeks. Civilians have also suffered numerous casualties as a result of UNITA bombardment of the city of Malange. The plight of internally displaced civilians fleeing the fighting, who risk landmines, ambushes and abuses by combatants on both sides, is of grave concern. In addition, the fate of soldiers on both sides who are hors de combat remains uncertain, as humanitarian principles have rarely been respected in the conflict. There were reports of forced recruitment of young men, including minors, in Bié, Lunda Norte, Lunda Su and Moxico, among other provinces. Again, MONUA has been unable to report on human rights conditions in UNITA-held areas, which are presumed to be precarious.

22. Continuing human rights violations due to a malfunctioning judicial system and to misconduct by some elements of enforcement agencies have been reported from many parts of the country. Prison conditions remain below minimum standards. In order to help improve the situation, MONUA has recently completed a five-day training programme of 62 Angolan human rights counsellors who will staff human rights centres in the municipalities of Benguela. This project, which is supported by central and provincial Angolan government authorities, will permit citizens to make complaints about human rights abuses and seek legal remedies.

23. Promotion activities focused on the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with its main theme of "Human Rights are Angolan Rights!". Activities at the national level included the broadcast on MONUA radio of a series of programmes with government officials and other experts discussing the Universal Declaration. At the provincial level, awareness campaigns on local radio stations and training workshops with community groups, as well as special activities, were organized with Angolan partners using the Universal Declaration as a central theme.

VIII. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

24. Since my previous report, the humanitarian situation in the country has drastically deteriorated. Following the loss of the two United Nations aircraft, all humanitarian air operations in Angola have been suspended, thereby ending the only possible means of delivering emergency relief supplies to many areas in the interior of the country. By some accounts, Angola is on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe. In several areas, the civilian population is trapped in the middle of the fighting, especially in the central highlands. The gradual worsening of security conditions in the country caused the number of new internally displaced persons to rise from 4,000 in April 1998 to 350,000 in November 1998. By the beginning of January 1999, the total number of new

internally displaced persons had reached 500,000, with reports of over 200,000 more. Numerous internally displaced persons previously sheltered in temporary settlements have had to flee for the second or third time in recent months. The hostilities have also led to the cessation of demining activities and the laying of new mines.

25. The immediate effects of the war have been increasing levels of malnutrition, especially among young children, and appalling sanitation and health conditions. As a result, the risk of epidemics has grown dramatically, especially in the war-affected areas, where the number of vulnerable persons is increasing rapidly, with little access to health care and medicine. Further deterioration of the situation may result in higher rates of mortality.

26. During the reporting period, the humanitarian community has concentrated on the provision of emergency assistance and has taken preventive measures to mitigate the effects of the current crisis. However, continued insecurity has forced humanitarian personnel to reduce the strength of field offices or to withdraw entirely. Vulnerable groups in the cities of Huambo, Kuito and Malange are being assisted with food and non-food items stockpiled during an earlier lull in the fighting. These stocks will most likely run out by mid-January 1999, if security conditions do not allow for relief supplies to be flown in soon. The above-mentioned three towns already accommodate almost 200,000 internally displaced persons, in addition to vulnerable host communities. Unless security can be provided for the transportation of humanitarian aid to the needy as well as for the personnel working in the field, it will be impossible to launch humanitarian operations in many affected areas. In the meantime, access to most of the interior of the country remains limited. It can therefore be assumed that the actual figures and needs of vulnerable groups could be even higher than currently estimated.

27. Should security conditions again allow a resumption of flights, the financial requirements of an intensive and sustained air operation will be well beyond currently available resources. The Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola, which was launched in December 1998, was developed under the assumption that emergency operations would focus on small pockets of vulnerable groups. However, recent events have altered that assumption, forcing humanitarian organizations to implement contingency plans and review their programme strategies. While the emergency needs outlined in the appeal remain valid, the added caseload will require a substantial increase in the emergency requirements to ensure an adequate response. It will also be important for the Government of Angola to increase its contribution to humanitarian programmes.

28. The ability of the humanitarian community to operate in Angola has also been very seriously affected by the constraints on access, including to UNITA-controlled areas, and the relocation of MONUA in Luanda with the resulting loss of United Nations military escorts for humanitarian convoys. It would be essential, in the present circumstances, for the United Nations to keep in mind the many lessons learned in similar recent humanitarian operations conducted amid open warfare. The future effectiveness of such operations in Angola will require a clear commitment by all concerned to respect the provisions of international humanitarian law, to allow unrestricted access to affected populations, including potential cross-line and cross-border operations, to

establish modalities for relief assessments and deliveries country-wide and to fully guarantee the safety and security of humanitarian personnel. In addition, humanitarian organizations will have to strengthen their human resources in Angola and put in place enhanced communication networks and security measures.

29. The present hostilities have also severely affected mine-clearing activities in Angola. All relevant operations have been interrupted, and international staff have been withdrawn to Luanda. It is feared that the equipment of demining teams currently stored at provincial centres could be lost as a result of the conflict and that local deminers will be recruited to serve with either FAA or UNITA. In the circumstances, it would be important to maintain, in Luanda, a basic programme that would cover the most pressing demining needs. The components of such a programme should include the maintenance of a database, the continuation of the mine-awareness campaign and mine victims assistance, as well as the retention of an emergency demining cell and a basic training capacity. This basic programme would enable the United Nations to retain the necessary surge capacity during the hostilities and to rebuild the mine programme once the fighting has subsided.

IX. SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS

30. The economic situation in Angola remains extremely precarious. The main factors indicated in my previous reports to the Council continue to have a significant impact on the economy. The implementation of policies and measures contained in the medium-term economic programme continues to suffer serious delays. The successive decline in the world prices of oil has gravely affected the financial situation of the Government. The 1998 budget was based on an expected price for Angolan oil of US$ 18 per barrel, whereas the present market price is closer to US$ 10. Thus, for every one dollar drop in prices, the Government loses nearly US$ 100 million per year. Not only do oil and petroleum products account for 50 per cent of gross domestic product, but over 80 per cent of government revenue is derived from the sale of those products.

31. It is obvious that Angola is confronted with a serious economic crisis. The annual rate of inflation is currently estimated at 100 per cent. The unpredictable fluctuations in foreign exchange rates, which have a direct bearing on prices, further exacerbate this situation. The Government has suspended its weekly devaluation of the national currency because, as a single policy measure, it has proved inadequate to address the deficiencies in the economy. It is estimated that government revenue has dropped by 30 per cent and, faced with a scheduled $1.2 billion loan payment for which oil was used as a guarantee, the Government may have to revert to further borrowing. The health, education, water and sanitation sectors bore the brunt of the cuts in expenditure brought about by the decline in oil prices.

32. In November, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission visited the country and reached a preliminary agreement with the Government on the need for a structural adjustment programme. This agreement was partly the result of an earlier visit to IMF by a government delegation to discuss IMF assistance programmes. The new agreement still awaits the official endorsement of the Angolan authorities.

X. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

33. The General Assembly, by its resolutions 52/8 C of 26 June 1998 and 53/211 of 18 December 1998, appropriated a total amount of $130.8 million gross, equivalent to a monthly rate of $10.9 million gross, for the maintenance of MONUA for the period from 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999.

34. I anticipate that the resources provided by the General Assembly would be sufficient to meet the Mission's requirements, including basic contingencies in connection with a decision by the Security Council regarding the future of the Mission. In the event that the authorized resources should prove insufficient, additional resources will be sought from the Assembly.

35. As at 31 December 1998, unpaid assessed contributions to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)/MONUA special account amounted to $101.2 million. The outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations amounted to $1,593.9 million.

XI. OBSERVATIONS

36. The events of the last few months have clearly demonstrated that, for all intents and purposes, the Angolan peace process has collapsed and the country is now in a state of war. Heavy fighting is taking place in several regions of the country, with dire consequences for the civilian population.

37. The dialogue between the Government and Mr. Savimbi and his movement, which was de facto interrupted in June 1998 after UNITA refused the extension of Sate administration in their strongholds, is now non-existent. The joint negotiation mechanisms remained idle for months and MONUA was prevented from discharging its mediation tasks. The parties have publicly committed themselves either to "neutralize" their opponent politically or to escalate the military confrontation. Numerous resolutions of the Security Council, urging the Government and UNITA to stop the fighting and return to the peace process, have not been heeded. Regional efforts and bilateral demarches are often ignored or simply not acknowledged.

38. The root causes of this deeply regrettable state of affairs are well known. They lie in UNITA's refusal to comply with basic provisions of the Lusaka Protocol which demanded that it demilitarize its forces and allow State administration to be extended throughout the national territory. This situation has been compounded by a lack of political tolerance and by an unwillingness to engage in mutual accommodation; nor has there been any evidence of a genuine effort to build political support by improving the basic living conditions of the population.

39. In light of the expressed determination of the parties to test their fortunes on the battlefield, the steadily worsening security situation, and the inability of MONUA to carry out its mandate, it has become increasingly clear that, for the time being, the conditions for a meaningful United Nations peacekeeping role in Angola have ceased to exist. In addition, the Government of Angola has informed the United Nations that it did not intend to support the

extension of MONUA beyond its current mandate. President dos Santos reiterated this position to Under-Secretary-General Sevan at their meeting of 6 January in Luanda. The Government's position was subsequently announced in the media. Furthermore, as a result of what appeared to be a coordinated media campaign against the United Nations and MONUA, a negative public atmosphere has emerged, including cases of harassment of United Nations personnel and the refusal of some local officials to cooperate with MONUA. The recent promises to moderate public statements by officials about the United Nations and to assist MONUA in the safe relocation of its team sites to Luanda are therefore welcome.

40. With regard to UNITA, it has so far not taken any serious initiative to restore meaningful contacts with the United Nations or to resume the implementation of key provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. UNITA has issued statements in favour of a continued United Nations presence. However, the attitude of some of its leaders towards the United Nations revealed itself when, in defiance of the universally recognized practice governing peacekeeping operations, 14 MONUA military and police personnel stationed in Andulo and Bailundo were prevented for several weeks from being redeployed to safer areas.

41. The presumed shooting down of two United Nations aircraft was a particularly outrageous crime apparently intended to intimidate the United Nations and force it to curtail its operations. I pay tribute to the ultimate sacrifice made by the passengers and the crews of these planes who, like the late Alioune Blondin Beye and his colleagues, dedicated their lives to the restoration of peace in Angola. I condemn these crimes in the strongest terms and am appalled by the parties' insensitivity and their lack of cooperation with the United Nations in the immediate aftermath of the crashes. It is imperative that a full-fledged investigation be conducted into the two incidents and that the perpetrators be identified. It is the least that can be done for the families of those reported missing while on a mission of peace. I urge, therefore, all concerned in Angola and beyond to assist in this endeavour.

42. Obviously, the Organization cannot impose its presence on the Angolan parties, nor can it play an effective role without their cooperation. The United Nations came to Angola at their explicit request and can be proud of what it accomplished. It has brought four years of relative peace, the longest such period Angola has ever enjoyed since its independence. However precarious and imperfect that peace may have been, UNAVEM III and MONUA provided to the Angolan parties ample political space in which to reach a peaceful solution and achieve national reconciliation. It is estimated that the United Nations and its programmes and agencies have also contributed up to US$ 1.5 billion in support of the peace process. History will, of course, pass judgement on the reasons for which this unique opportunity was missed. In the meantime, however, the parties and their leaders must assume full and direct responsibility for the suffering of their people.

43. In the circumstances, I believe that MONUA has no other option but to continue to reduce its presence within Angola, and proceed with the orderly repatriation of United Nations personnel and property as requested by the Angolan Government. If the present pace of redeployment is maintained, all MONUA team sites and regional headquarters will have been withdrawn to Luanda by

mid-February. Upon the expiration of MONUA's mandate on 26 February 1999, the United Nations would then proceed with its technical liquidation.

44. At present, I envisage that most of the military, police and civilian personnel of the Mission will have been repatriated by 20 March 1999. However, to conduct an effective liquidation, adequate human and material resources would have to be maintained in Angola. Given the scale and duration of the operations of UNAVEM and MONUA, it is estimated that four to six months would be required to complete this exercise on the ground. During the first few months of this period, the presence of a strong security detachment - an infantry company of up to 200 personnel - would be needed to protect United Nations property. It would also be necessary to retain an adequate air capacity, as well as other support services and administrative personnel. The presence of the infantry detachment would require the concurrence of the Security Council. I expect the Government and UNITA to extend their full cooperation to MONUA for its relocation to Luanda and for the repatriation of its personnel and equipment.

45. While MONUA can no longer play a useful role in the present circumstances, the United Nations and the international community should not and must not turn its back on Angola and the Angolan people. Undoubtedly, the resumption of the war will bring increased suffering for the civilian population and will have serious consequences for peace and security beyond Angola's borders. The United Nations must therefore remain actively involved and persist in its efforts to assist the Angolans to find the earliest possible resolution of this fratricidal conflict which has lasted longer than any other in Africa. I remain convinced that the long-term interests of the Angolan people and the principle of national reconciliation cannot be served by attempts to marginalize one's opponent or through a military solution. The United Nations, which has invested so much effort and resources in Angola, stands ready to play a political role, if requested, in order to assist all concerned in Angola in reaching a peaceful solution. Consequently, it is my intention to designate a senior official to serve as my Special Envoy for Angola. The Special Envoy would be based in New York, together with requisite support staff, and would cooperate and liaise with the members of the Security Council, with other interested Member States, and, to the extent possible, with the parties to the Angolan conflict, in efforts to bring peace to Angola. In case the political and military situation improves and the necessary conditions are in place, my Special Envoy, together with the support staff, could be rapidly relocated to Angola. Chief among the conditions for such a relocation would be unambiguous undertakings by the parties concerned to extend full cooperation to my Special Envoy for all purposes of the mission.

46. The work of the United Nations human rights presence in Angola has received well-deserved praise for its efforts to strengthen national institutions, promote human rights, and prevent their abuse. It should, subject to the concurrence of the Angolan parties and satisfactory security guarantees, continue its activities. Its activities would be aimed at strengthening systems for the administration of justice, developing the capacity of national institutions and non-governmental institutions in the field of human rights, gathering information about the human rights situation, disseminating information about and promoting understanding of human rights, and encouraging the growth of civil society as a partner in building peace and development for human rights, as well as providing technical assistance in relevant areas.

47. The humanitarian situation in Angola, already critical, has the potential to develop into a full-scale humanitarian catastrophe. Humanitarian agencies and organizations are confronted with increasing numbers of affected persons, while access to them is hampered, if not prevented, by hostilities, landmines and restrictions with regard to UNITA-held areas. The United Nations is ready and willing to continue and intensify its humanitarian assistance to the Angolan people, but it cannot do so without guarantees of access and assurances for the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and operations. I urge the Government of Angola and the leaders of UNITA to provide such guarantees and assurances and extend their full cooperation to humanitarian agencies and organizations working in Angola.

48. I have instructed my Special Representative to consult urgently with the Government of Angola and all others concerned on the strategy and modalities outlined in paragraphs 45-47 above, including limited United Nations presence in Angola. I shall inform the Security Council of the outcome of these consultations as soon as possible.

49. In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, to the Force Commander and to all military, police and civilian personnel of MONUA, as well as to humanitarian workers and representatives of non-governmental organizations, for the courageous and dedicated way in which they have been carrying out their duties in the dangerous situation prevailing in Angola.

Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Angola: contributions as at 18 January 1999

	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Grand Total
Argentina	-	15	-	15	
Bangladesh	3	20	1	-	24
Brazil	4	9	2	-	15
Bulgaria	3	13	-	-	16
Congo	2	-	-	-	2
Egypt	3	15	-	-	18
France	3	-	-	-	3
Gambia	-	4	-	-	4
Ghana	3	6	-	-	9
Guinea-Bissau	2	4	-	-	6
Hungary	3	8	-	-	11
India	5	11	8	138	162
Jordan	3	19	-	-	22
Kenya	3	6	-	-	9
Malaysia	4	16	-	-	20
Mali	3	12	-	-	15
Namibia	-	-	2	134	136
New Zealand	1	-	-	-	1
Nigeria	4	15	-	-	19
Norway	3	-	-	-	3
Pakistan	3	-	1[b]	-	4
Poland	4	-	-	-	4
Portugal	2	38	4	40	84
Romania	-	-	4	138	142
Russian Federation	3	-	3	100	106
Senegal	4	-	-	-	4
Slovakia	3	-	-	-	3

	Military observers	Civilian police observers	Staff officers[a]	Troops	Grand Total
Spain	-	14	-	-	14
Sweden	3	10	-	-	13
Ukraine	3	-	1	-	4
United Republic of Tanzania	-	3	-	-	3
Uruguay	3	27	2	-	32
Zambia	3	22	7	-	32
Zimbabwe	3	22	4	-	29
Total	86	309	39	550	984

Note: One United Nations military observer (Russian Federation), one United Nations police observer (Egypt), one United Nations police observer (Zambia), and one peacekeeper each from the Namibian Military Task Force (NAMMTF) and the Ration Support Unit (RASU) have been missing since 26 December 1998 owing to an aircraft accident; and one peacekeeper from NAMMTF has been missing since 2 January 1999 owing to an aircraft accident.

[a] Including military police.

[b] A military specialist in the demining school.



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